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INTRODUCTION

Over the past few years, jurisdictions across the country have
enacted specialized organizational forms to house social enterprises.
Social enterprises are entities dedicated to a blended mission of
earning profits for owners and promoting social good. They are
neither typical businesses, concentrated on the bottom line of profit,
nor traditional charities, geared toward achieving some mission of
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good for society. Their founders instead see value in blending both
goals. They believe their social enterprises will be superior to
traditional businesses by considering and internalizing the social
costs they produce.1 They believe social enterprises more efficiently
produce social goods than traditional charities by applying business
methods to this important work.2 Yet, these social entrepreneurs
worry traditional organizational forms designed for either businesses
or charities will constrain their ability to achieve the gains they see in
blended mission enterprises.3 Legislatures have obviously been
convinced. Since 2008, lawmakers in nearly one-third of U.S.
jurisdictions have enacted enabling legislation providing one or more
specialized forms designed to house social enterprises.4 Thus far,
these specialized forms have taken three distinct types, the latest of
which is the subject of this Article: the flexible purpose corporation.

1. See, e.g., Julie Battilana et al., In Search of the Hybrid Ideal, STAN. SOC.
INNOVATION REV., Summer 2012, at 51, 52 (describing the desire of social
entrepreneurs to exploit the positive externalities of linking social value and revenue
creation).
2. See, e.g., Kyle Westaway, New Legal Structures for ‘Social Entrepreneurs,’
WALL ST. J. (Dec. 12, 2011, 12:42 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/
SB10001424052970203413304577088604063391944.html (“Social entrepreneurs
believe a business can be part of the solution to some of the world’s greatest
challenges.”); see also DAN PALLOTTA, UNCHARITABLE: HOW RESTRAINTS ON
NONPROFITS UNDERMINE THEIR POTENTIAL 35–127 (2008) (arguing that greater social
good would be gained by allowing charities to follow a range of practices typically
identified with for-profit enterprises); Charles R. Bronfman & Jeffrey R. Solomon,
Should Philanthropies Operate Like Businesses? Yes: Good Intentions Aren’t Enough,
WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2011, at R1, R4 (“Adhering to sound business principles makes a
nonprofit more likely to accomplish its mission, not less.”). But see Garry W. Jenkins,
Who’s Afraid of Philanthrocapitalism?, 61 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 753 (2011)
(challenging the benefit of applying business methods and techniques in philanthropy
and traditional nonprofits).
3. Battilana et al., supra note 1, at 52 (describing the “confusing dilemma” facing
social entrepreneurs confronted with only pure for-profit and nonprofit organizational
forms); Heerad Sabeti, The For-Benefit Enterprise, HARV. BUS. REV. (Nov. 2011),
http://hbr.org/2011/11/the-for-benefit-enterprise/ar/1 (lamenting that “socially minded
entrepreneurs end up shoehorning their vision into one structure or the other and
accepting burdensome trade-offs in the process”); Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of
Entity on the Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337, 363–64 (2009).
I am sympathetic to the view that corporate law would not prevent adopters of a
standard for-profit corporation from pursuing both business and non-business goals.
See, e.g., LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 25–31 (2012); Einer Elhauge,
Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 738–47
(2005). This, however, clearly is not the perception from which social enterprise form
creators and enthusiasts are working.
4. See generally Laws, AMS. FOR CMTY. DEV. (last visited Nov. 25, 2012),
http://americansforcommunitydevelopment.org/laws.html (listing nine states and two
Native American tribes with L3C statutes); State by State Legislative Status—Benefit
Corporation, B LAB, http://www.benefitcorp.net/state-by-state-legislative-status (last
visited Nov. 25, 2012) (listing twelve states with benefit corporation statutes, three of
which also have L3C legislation); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2500–3503 (West 2012).
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Part I places the flexible purpose corporation (“FPC”) in the
broader context of other specialized legal forms established to house
social enterprise. Part II explores the FPC in greater depth. After
explaining the genesis of its enabling legislation, this Part details and
critiques its major provisions. These components segregate the FPC
form from traditional for-profit and nonprofit corporations. The
statutes structure FPCs’ operations, guide their fiduciaries, and
empower their shareholders with enforcement rights. Part III
summarizes my evaluation of these attributes and compares them
with relevant aspects of other specialized forms for social enterprise.
Part IV briefly concludes.
I.

THE FPC IN CONTEXT

The flexible purpose corporation became available under the
California Corporate Flexibility Act of 2011 (the “FPC statute”).5 It
joined its (only slightly) older colleagues: the low-profit limited
liability company (“L3C”) inaugurated by Vermont in 20086 and the
benefit corporation first adopted by Maryland in 2010.7 Since their
initial adoption, these forms have each been adopted by several other
jurisdictions and proposed in still others.8 These later adoptions are
not identical to the originals, though sufficient overlap exists to
examine the L3C and benefit corporation as archetypes. Shortly
after California adopted its FPC statute, Washington approved
legislation enabling a Social Purpose Corporation form, which shares
some, though by no means all, of the elements of the FPC.9 Other
5. See S.B. 201, 2011–2012 Legis. Sess. (Cal. 2011) (approved by Governor Jerry
Brown on Oct. 9, 2011); see also Stephanie Strom, A Quest for Hybrid Companies That
Profit, But Can Tap Charity, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 13, 2011, at B1, B2 (reporting that
“California is the latest state to adopt a statute permitting what is called a flexiblepurpose corporation, new companies that are part social benefit and part low-profit
entities” and comparing that statute with low-profit limited liability company (“L3C”)
and benefit corporation law adoptions in other jurisdictions).
6. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11 § 3001(27) (2012); see also Low-Profit Limited
Liability
Company,
VT.
SECRETARY
ST.
CORP.
DIVISION,
http://www.sec.state.vt.us/corps/dobiz/llc/llc_l3c.htm (last visited Nov. 16, 2012) (“A
low-profit LLC is a new type of company, called an ‘L3C.’ Vermont is the first state to
enact this new type of company.”).
7. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS §§ 5-6C-01 to -08 (LexisNexis 2012).
8. For current listings of L3C and benefit corporation enabling legislation
enactments, see Laws, supra note 4 and State by State Legislative Status, supra note 4
respectively. See also Carter G. Bishop, Fifty State Series: L3C & B Corporation
Legislation Table (Suffolk Univ. Law Sch. Research Paper, No. 10-11, 2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1561783 (analyzing the contents of legislation); J.
Haskell Murray, Benefit Corporations—State Statute Comparison Chart (Regent Univ.
Sch. of Law, 2011) (unpublished chart), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1988556
(analyzing the contents of benefit corporation statutes).
9. See generally H.B. 2239, 2011–12 Leg., 2012 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2012).
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state legislatures have considered new forms that share features with
the FPC,10 and other countries have implemented yet further
models.11 To situate the FPC form in context, without overwhelming
the reader with details on too many jurisdiction-specific enactments,
this Part will discuss the major features of the L3C and benefit
corporation in brief.
The low-profit limited liability company operates like a standard
limited liability company (“LLC”) with only a handful of deviations.
All of these changes address the specialized purposes adopting
entities must pursue. Specifically, L3Cs must “significantly further[]
the accomplishment of one or more charitable or educational
purposes within the meaning of” the Internal Revenue Code sections
defining charitable contributions,12 and “no significant purpose of the
company is the production of income or property.”13 That said, an
L3C that actually produces significant income or capital appreciation
will not be disqualified from this status by virtue of those facts
alone.14
Other than these adaptations of the L3Cs’ purposes, the statutes
typically subject them to ordinary for-profit LLC law. Their
governance structures are highly flexible, subject to private ordering
by an operating agreement. In contrast to the benefit corporation and
the FPC to be described below, L3Cs have no special disclosure
obligations, no expressly modified fiduciary duties,15 and no
10. E.g., S.B. 62, 117th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2012); H.F. 697, 87th Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2011).
11. See, e.g., Dana Brakman Reiser, Governing and Financing Blended Enterprise,
85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 619, 630–36 (2010) [hereinafter Brakman Reiser, Governing and
Financing] (discussing the United Kingdom’s community interest company (“CIC”));
Matthew F. Doeringer, Note, Fostering Social Enterprise: A Historical and
International Analysis, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291, 306–16 (2010) (describing
the CIC in the U.K and the Belgian Société à Finalité Sociale).
12. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11 § 3001(27)(A).
13. Id. § 3001(27)(B).
14. See id. In addition, L3Cs may not be formed to “accomplish one or more
political or legislative purposes,” again as defined by the tax code. Id. § 3001(27)(C).
15. Some commentators argue adapted duties for L3C fiduciaries are created by
statutory implication. See, e.g., J. Haskell Murray & Edward I. Hwang, Purpose with
Profit: Governance, Enforcement, Capital-Raising and Capital-Locking in Low-Profit
Limited Liability Companies, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 39–40 (2011); John Tyler,
Negating the Legal Problem of Having “Two Masters”: A Framework for L3C
Fiduciary Duties and Accountability, 35 VT. L. REV. 117, 141 (2010). Others,
including myself, argue that L3C statutes leave fiduciary obligations dangerously
uncertain. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Blended Enterprise and the Dual Mission
Dilemma, 35 VT. L. REV. 105, 109–11 (2010) [hereinafter Brakman Reiser, Blended
Enterprise]; Brakman Reiser, Governing and Financing, supra note 11, at 623–30;
Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, EMORY L.J.
(forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 18–19) [hereinafter Brakman Reiser, Theorizing
Forms]; J. William Callison & Allan W. Vestal, The L3C Illusion: Why Low-Profit
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limitations on change of status. In fact, an L3C ceases to exist as
such, and transforms immediately into an ordinary LLC, if at any
time it no longer meets the special purpose requirements.16 This
transformation occurs by operation of law. The entity need not file
any documents indicating the change, managers and members have
no official input, and no regulator is involved.17
When compared to the L3C, the statutory framework establishing
the benefit corporation is both more extensive and more rigid. This
is due, in part, to the fact that benefit corporations borrow the forprofit corporate form as a starting point. The signature innovation of
the benefit corporation form, however, is its reliance upon “thirdparty standards.”18 These standards play a powerful role, as benefit
corporations must: (1) frame their required public benefit purposes
with reference to them, and (2) issue reports to shareholders and the
public evaluating their achievements according to them. Benefit
corporation statutes differ in the level of detail at which they define
the content of such standards. For example, California’s statute
defines a third-party standard as “a comprehensive assessment of the
impact of the business and the business’s operations upon” a broad
range of stakeholder groups.19 In contrast, Maryland’s legislation
requires only a generic “standard for defining, reporting, and
addressing best practices in corporate social and environmental
performance.”20 All benefit corporation statutes demand that thirdparty standards be developed by transparent, independent entities.21
Limited Liability Companies Will Not Stimulate Socially Optimal Private Foundation
Investment In Entrepreneurial Ventures, 35 VT. L. REV. 273, 286–89 (2010).
16. See, e.g., VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11 § 3001(27)(D).
17. A more detailed account and critique of the L3C form can be found in Brakman
Reiser, Governing and Financing, supra note 11, at 620–30.
18. See Dana Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations—A Sustainable Form of
Organization?, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 591, 592, 600–03 (2011) [hereinafter
Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations]; J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master:
Social Enterprise, Certifications, and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L.
REV. 1, 21 (2012) [hereinafter Murray, Choose Your Own Master]; J. William Callison,
Putting New Sheets on a Procrustean Bed: How Benefit Corporations Address
Fiduciary Duties, the Dangers Created, and Suggestions for Change, 2 AM. U. BUS. L.
REV. 85, 90–91, 94 (2012) [hereinafter Callison, Procrustean Bed].
19. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 14601(g). References in this Article will cite
legislation as adopted by various jurisdictions as examples, rather than the model
statute drafted by benefit corporation proponents. This model statute can be consulted
at
MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS.
(B
Lab 2012),
available
at
http://benefitcorp.org/storage/Model_Legislation.pdf. For a thorough description and
evaluation of the benefit corporation form, see generally Brakman Reiser, Benefit
Corporations, supra note 18.
20. MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-01(e).
21. See, e.g., id.; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-1 (West 2012); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1782 (Supp. 2012).
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Benefit corporation statutes also make several important revisions
to standard for-profit corporate governance arrangements. Benefit
corporation directors must consider a very broad range of nonshareholder stakeholder interests when making decisions.22 Benefit
corporations must report to shareholders and the public on their
pursuit and achievement of their public benefit purposes.23 With this
information in hand, benefit corporation shareholders can sue
fiduciaries to hold them to their expanded duties, sometimes using
new enforcement actions created under the statutes.24 Shareholders
also must approve adoption or abandonment of benefit corporation
status by a supermajority vote.25
The L3C and the benefit corporation represent poles on a spectrum
of flexibility. On the one hand, the L3C allows almost complete
contractual freedom to order a social enterprise as founders might
desire. The statutory scheme imposes no new obligations on
fiduciaries and no disclosure requirements. It is a status that may be
taken on and thrown off with ease, merely by changing the purposes
the entity pursues. On the other hand, the benefit corporation
provides a comprehensive set of “off-the-rack” governance
arrangements, many of which cannot be varied by adopters. It enlists
the assistance of third-party standard setters to develop metrics to
gauge the public benefit bona fides of adopting entities. It also
varies fiduciary duties, creates reporting obligations, and empowers
shareholders with voting and litigation rights. As the next Part will
describe, the FPC sits somewhere between these two poles, offering
significant flexibility and discretion for founders and directors, but
paired with expansive rights, powers, and protections for shareholder
investors.26

22. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS’NS § 5-6C-07 (requiring directors to
consider impact of their decisions on employees, customers, the community, society,
and the local and global environment); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 21.09 (similar).
23. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-791; HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 420D-11
(2011).
24. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-10; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1825 (2012).
25. See, e.g., N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1705 (McKinney 2012); A277, 119th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2012) (to be codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-230).
26. For analyses of the FPC comparing it with other forms, see Eric Talley,
Corporate Form and Social Entrepreneurship: A Status Report from California (and
Beyond) (U.C. Berkeley Pub. Law Research Paper No. 2144567), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2144567; Robert T. Esposito, The Social Enterprise
Revolution in Corporate Law: A Primer on Hybrid Corporate Entities in Europe and
the United States and the Case for the Benefit Corporation, WM. & MARY L. REV.
(forthcoming
2013)
(manuscript
at
54–57),
available
at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2134022.
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II. THE FPC IN DEPTH

The history of the FPC actually begins not with the L3C or benefit
corporation, but rather with the 2008 proposal of a constituency
statute for California.27 Constituency statutes permit for-profit
corporate directors to consider the interests of non-shareholder
stakeholders when making decisions, dislodging any real or
perceived legal requirement to maximize shareholder value.28 Some
constituency statutes limit this broadened directorial discretion to the
takeover context, but others apply it more comprehensively to
directorial action.29 Over thirty U.S. jurisdictions now have
constituency statutes of one type or another.30 California does not.
In 2008, State Senator Mark Leno and others sought to change that.
He sponsored a bill granting for-profit corporate directors the option
to consider the interests of various stakeholder groups, along with the
long- and short-term interests of shareholders in both ordinary and
change of control situations.31 In the view of the bill’s proponents, a
constituency statute was pivotal to attract and maintain sociallyresponsible businesses in California.32
Important representatives of the business community opposed the
bill. For example, both the state bar’s Business Section and the
California Chamber of Commerce argued it was unnecessary and
threatened to undermine directors’ accountability.33 Although the
bill passed both houses of the state legislature without their support,
then-Governor Schwarzenegger ultimately vetoed it. His veto
27. This Part will discuss the California FPC. If the experiences of the L3C and
benefit corporation are any guide, the California approach will be considered and may
be adopted, with small or significant variations, by other jurisdictions. If they do,
future work can examine these emendations. At this early stage, the California statute
is the appropriate model.
28. See Lisa Fairfax, Doing Well While Doing Good: Reassessing the Scope of
Directors’ Fiduciary Obligations in For-Profit Corporations with Non-Shareholder
Beneficiaries, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 409, 460–61 (2002); Eric W. Orts, Beyond
Shareholders: Interpreting Corporate Constituency Statutes, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
14, 27–29 (1992); Tyler, supra note 15, at 132.
29. See Tyler, supra note 15, at 133; see also Orts, supra note 28, at 30–31.
30. See Tyler, supra note 15, at 132; see also Fairfax, supra note 28, at 460–61
(placing the count at thirty-two in an earlier work).
31. See CAL. S. JUDICIARY COMM., AB 2944 BILL ANALYSIS (2008), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/asm/ab_2901-2950/ab_2944_cfa_20080611
_123248_sen_comm.html.
32. See id. (“California has the highest concentration of corporations trying to
practice business responsibly, but the lack of a constituency statute is an impediment to
these corporations as they grow and seek investment capital, threatening California’s
leadership position.”).
33. See id. (quoting comments by the bar association and chamber of commerce in
discussing the views of the bill’s opponents).
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message grounded his action in the need for caution in the “serious
matter” of corporate governance, but “urge[d] the Legislature to
consider and study new styles of corporate governance that can offer
alternatives to the current model, but that maintain the vital
shareholder protections that have helped turn California into the
economic powerhouse of the world.”34
The bill lacked sufficient support to obtain a legislative override,
but its significant success and the governor’s message buoyed a
group of California lawyers to try to create a specialized legal form
to house social enterprises.35 They formed a working group of ten
and together engaged in an extensive drafting process to develop the
bill that became the Corporate Flexibility Act, sponsored by State
Senator Mark DeSaulnier and passed unanimously by the Senate and
in substantially similar form by a large majority in the Assembly.36
Governor Jerry Brown signed it into law and it took effect, enabling
entities to register as FPCs, beginning January 1, 2012.37
The FPC uses the California corporate form as its foundation.38
But, like all specialized forms recently developed to house social

34. Arnold Schwarzenegger, AB 2994 Veto Message, OFFICIAL CAL. LEGIS. INFO.
(Sept. 30, 2008), http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/07-08/bill/asm
/ab_2901-2950/ab_2944_vt_20080930.html.
35. W. Derrick Britt, R. Todd Johnson & Susan H. MacCormac, Proposed
Amendments to the California Corporations Code for a New Corporate Form: The
Flexible Purpose Corporation and Senate Bill 201—Frequently Asked Questions, BUS.
FOR GOOD (Feb. 23, 2011), http://businessforgood.blogspot.com/2011/03/frequentlyasked-questions-proposed.html.
36. The Working Group members are W. Derrick Britt (Co-chair), Partner, Doty,
Barlow, Britt, and Thomas, LLP; R. Todd Johnson (Co-chair), Partner, Jones Day;
Susan H. MacCormac (Co-chair), Partner, Morrison Foerster; Keith Paul Bishop,
Partner, Allen Matkins Leck Gamble & Mallory LLP; Edward A. Deibert, Director,
Howard Rice Nemerovski Canady Falk & Rabkin; William P. Fitzpatrick, General
Counsel, Omidyar Network; Steven K. Hazen, Retired, Former Vice-Chair for
Legislation of the State Bar of California Business Law Section; David M. Hernand,
Partner, Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP; Jay A. Mitchell, Director, Organizations and
Transactions Clinic, Stanford Law School and former chief corporate counsel of Levi
Strauss & Co.; and Robert A. Wexler, Partner, Adler & Colvin. See id.
37. The registration process utilized by the Secretary of State makes it difficult to
obtain a precise count of current FPCs. See E-mail from Business Filings, California
Secretary of State, to Rachel Seelig (Feb. 22, 2012, 7:58 P.M.) (on file with author)
(providing a list of the fifteen entities who had filed to form or change status to either
FPC or benefit corporation status: The Ideal World; Prometheus Civic Technologies,
FPC; Strozzi Institute; Great Pacific Iron Works; Lost Arrow Corporation; Patagonia,
Inc.; Opticos Design, Inc.; Give Something Back, Inc.; JP & Sun, Inc.; Thinkshift;
Dopehut; The University of the Brain; Farm From a Box, Inc.; Search Inside Yourself
Leadership Initiative Inc.; and Patagonia Provisions Inc.). See also Talley, supra note
26, at 6–7 fig. 1 & 12 n.15 (reporting results of the only empirical study to date
whereby data collected with the help of the California Commissioner of Corporations
showed fifteen entities had registered as FPCs between January and August 2012).
38. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2501.
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enterprises, the FPC builds on its original model. Its additions work
to segregate the new form from existing ones, guide the conduct of
entities operating as FPCs, and provide channels for enforcement.
A. Segregating FPCs

Only entities adopting FPC status may access its permission to
brazenly pursue both profit and social good, and founders and
shareholders together guard admission to it. To become an FPC, a
corporation must include the term “flexible purpose corporation” or
an abbreviation in its name, and it must identify its particular special
purpose or purposes in its articles of incorporation.39 The breadth of
FPCs’ permitted purposes is striking. The statute not only expressly
allows FPCs to pursue charitable purposes like those of traditional
nonprofits,40 but also permits adopting entities to choose to pursue
the interests of the broadest range of non-shareholder stakeholders.41
These include employers, suppliers, customers, creditors, the
community, society, and the environment.42 This broad vision of the
social “good” FPCs might pursue places the definition of that
contested term, and the discretion over what type of purpose their
entities will pursue, precisely and exclusively in the hands of the
founders.43
At the very beginning of an FPC’s life cycle, however, we see too
its reliance on disclosure to shareholders. The flexible-purpose
quality of an adopting corporation must be broadcast in its very
name. Investors need look no further than an FPC’s foundational
documents to learn toward precisely what other kinds of ends its
leaders might sacrifice returns. Neither shareholders nor any
member of the public should mistake an FPC for a traditional forprofit corporation, or a nonprofit one for that matter.

39. Id. § 2602.
40. See id. § 2602(b)(2)(A) (permitting an FPC to cite among its special purposes

“[o]ne or more charitable or public purpose activities that a nonprofit public benefit
corporation is authorized to carry out”).
41. See id. § 2602(b)(2)(B) (allowing an FPC to adopt a special “purpose of
promoting positive short-term or long-term effects of, or minimizing adverse shortterm or long-term effects of” its activities on “employees, suppliers, customers, and
creditors, [t]he community and society, [or] . . . [t]he environment”).
42. See id.
43. Unlike benefit corporation statutes, the FPC framework does not require
adopting entities to apply a third-party standard to evaluate their pursuit of social good.
Compare id. § 2602(b), with VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-782 (requiring benefit corporations
to pursue a general public benefit, defined as “a material positive impact on society and
the environment taken as a whole, as measured by a third-party standard, from the
business and operations of a benefit corporation”).
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Once an FPC has been created, changing this status also requires
both prompting by its leaders and substantial buy-in from
shareholders. If directors propose any amendment to the articles that
would “materially alter any special purpose of the flexible purpose
corporation,” two-thirds of the outstanding shares of each class of
shareholders must approve it.44 Indeed, this heightened threshold
applies even if article amendments would result in a corporation still
qualifying as an FPC, but pursuing a different special purpose or
purposes than before.45 It likewise requires shareholder consensus
when a corporate transaction would affect a change in the purpose or
flexible purpose status.46
The breadth of special purposes the statute permits suggests that
changes in purpose within the FPC umbrella are quite possible.
Consider Edify FPC, a hypothetical FPC formed to pursue profits
and social good by providing low-cost educational services to
children of the working poor. Its directors could propose an article
amendment to transform the entity’s purposes to the pursuit of profits
and the promotion of the long-term positive effects of its activities on
its employees by offering its educational services at higher prices to
children of more affluent parents. Greater revenues would offset
investments in professional development and higher wages for
employees. The new emphasis on benefitting employees is a special
purpose clearly permitted by the FPC statute, but is a considerable
change of focus from its former mission of educating needy kids.
The FPC statute takes no position on the relative merits of these
different purposes,47 but requires shareholders to approve such a
change by a large majority.
Shareholders are given additional protections against loss of
economic value in FPC conversions. The ultimate protection is
afforded to shareholders opposing an FPC’s conversion to a
nonprofit entity. Here, the statute demands that shareholders
unanimously approve the transaction before adopting nonprofit
status, which would terminate their rights to distributions.48 Thus, a

44.
45.
46.
47.

CAL. CORP. CODE § 3000(b).
Id.
See id. §§ 3100, 3201.
See Britt, Johnson & MacCormac, supra note 35 (“The Working Group
believes strongly, and unanimously, that the proposed approach provides the best
manner for permitting what is now prohibited, in a manner that does not include the
intellectual and technical complexity of defining ‘what is good’ . . . .”).
48. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 3001 (requiring that such transactions “shall be
approved by all of the outstanding shares of all classes”) (emphasis added).
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single dissenting shareholder can stop an FPC from transforming into
nonprofit entity.
The statute erects less daunting, but still considerable, barriers to
conversions between FPC and ordinary for-profit status. At least
two-thirds of each class of voting shares must approve any
conversion by an ordinary for-profit corporation into an FPC or vice
versa.49
These supermajority voting rights ensure significant
shareholder consensus will stand behind any shift into or out of FPC
status, providing substantial protection to even sufficiently large
minority shareholder groups. Moreover, even if an approving
supermajority shareholder vote is secured, dissenters may opt to have
their shares purchased by the corporation for “[t]he fair market
value . . . determined as of the day before the first announcement of
the terms of the proposed [transaction].”50
This appraisal-type remedy appears better designed to protect
dissenters in transactions converting entities into FPC form than
away from it. Appraisal rights in a conversion from for-profit to
FPC status can be seen as conventional protection for the economic
rights of minorities.51 If shareholders invest in a traditional
corporation and dissent from its conversion to an FPC to pursue
special purposes along with profit, we can assume their concerns are
financial—they fear their investment will lose economic value when
it becomes a stake in an FPC rather than a traditional business entity.
If we put aside the typically substantial costs of an appraisal
proceeding, dissenters’ financial interests should be protected by
requiring the converting corporation to cash them out at a price
reflecting the value of the entity as a standard profit-centered
business. This right to be cashed out by the corporation is
particularly important to protect shareholders’ financial interests
when there is no ready market for the dissenting investors’ shares.
49. Id. §§ 1152(d)(1), 3002, 3301.
50. Id. § 1300(a); id. § 1152(d)(2) (providing dissenting shareholders rights under

Section 1300 in transactions converting traditional business entities into FPCs); id. §
3305 (providing dissenters rights under Section 1300 in transactions converting an FPC
into another type of business entity).
51. See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, BUS. ORGS. L. 636 (2011) (“in
theory the ostensible purpose of the statutory appraisal remedy is to protect the
minority and offer them a way out in case of fundamental changes . . . .”); see also
Hideki Kanda & Saul Levmore, The Appraisal Remedy and the Goals of Corporate
Law, 32 UCLA L. REV. 429, 434 (1985) (describing the conventional rationale for
appraisal as allowing dissenters to decamp from a corporation about to undergo a
fundamental change with which they disagree). Modern authors critique this
conventional view, however, due to the delay and expense involved in appraisal
litigation. This issue will be addressed infra. See infra notes 54 & 55 and
accompanying text.
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The rationale for the statute’s dissenters’ rights as financial
protection for shareholders opposed to conversion of FPCs to forprofits is considerably weaker. These shareholders could oppose an
FPC to for-profit conversion purely on economic grounds. Perhaps
they view social enterprises as more sustainable and therefore
ultimately able to outperform solely profit-focused ones even on
economic terms. At least in the short term, however, following a
conversion from FPC to standard corporate status, one would expect
former FPCs to cut costs and achieve greater profits. If so,
dissenting shareholders could achieve financial protection by
remaining invested through the conversion, after which they would
gain from the pure for-profit’s greater economic value. The problem,
as is frequently the case in appraisal, is the likely lack of a market.52
For dissenting shareholders to protect their financial investment this
way, they need to be able to realize the entity’s value by accessing a
market for post-conversion sale of their shares.53 They can then use
the funds they obtain through sale to make substitute investments.
When the converted corporation does not have a market for its
shares, however, an appraisal remedy could conceivably remain
useful financial protection (again, setting aside its likely costs).
Its utility ultimately depends on whether courts can define and
apply the fair market value concept to avoid undercompensating
dissenters in FPC conversions. Imagine LocalCorp, a manufacturing
concern founded as an FPC with a special purpose to pursue the
long-term interests of its local community. LocalCorp’s board of
directors proposes a transaction that would lead to the abandonment
of this special purpose. Although more than two-thirds of LocalCorp
shareholders approve the transaction, ten percent vote against it.
Consider a dissenting LocalCorp shareholder, Sarah, who purchased
a share of the FPC for $100. Sarah invested $100 in LocalCorp
because she valued the financial return she expected LocalCorp to
produce for her at $80, and she valued its commitment to further
local community interests at $20. Once freed of its obligation to
pursue these local interests, LocalCorp could earn greater economic
returns. For simplicity, we can assume its value as a pure for-profit
52. See Britt, Johnson & MacCormac, supra note 35 (“Dissenter’s rights seemed
particularly important in achieving the [FPC Working Group’s] goal of ensuring that a
change in form should cause no harm to shareholders or investors, particularly where
the company involved is a private company with no liquidity for shareholders.”).
53. Appraisal rights statutes often recognize the differing positions of dissenting
shareholders by excepting those with marketable shares from their protections. See
COX & HAZEN, supra note 51, at 640; see also Kanda & Levmore, supra note 51, at
432.
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is $100 per share. Perhaps LocalCorp would achieve these greater
returns by more cheaply sourcing components outside its community
or by transferring human or physical resources to a less costly
location. Sarah does not want the company to move in this direction,
but she has been outvoted. She fears there will not be a market for
the converted entity’s shares, and so she pursues her dissenters’
rights.
Under the FPC statute, Sarah is entitled to the fair market value of
her shares, valuing LocalCorp prior to the conversion’s
announcement. The question is: How will fair market value be
defined? If appraisal provides Sarah $100, it will go a long way
toward protecting her financial interests. She might reinvest the
$100 in another locally-focused social enterprise. Alternatively, she
might invest $80 in a pure for-profit and invest in or donate $20 to a
community-focused entity. Assuming substitutes exist, she might
engage in any number transactions to achieve her desired mix of
profit and social good. On the other hand, if appraisal provides
Sarah only $80, valuing only the entity’s purely economic returns
pre-transaction, dissenting shareholders like Sarah are
underprotected.
They will have insufficient funds to avail
themselves of substitutes for their FPC investment that has ceased to
exist.
A court using the fair market value concept will need to be very
nimble to avoid this outcome. It must not only determine the FPC’s
economic value, but also some price for the utility of the social good
it generates, or at least the economic value foregone in generating
that social good. Attempting to include appreciation in fair market
value will add further complications. Valuations of appraisal rights
in pure for-profits are already notoriously tricky.54 Applying the
concept in a transaction converting an FPC into a for-profit will be
even more difficult.
Moreover, and perhaps most importantly, the appraisal tool can
only offer cash as its remedy for lost social good production. But,
there are some things money simply cannot buy. For FPC
shareholders, the significant risks of a conversion transaction are
non-financial; they fear the abandonment of the entity’s special
purpose. It seems far more likely that Sarah opposes LocalCorp’s

54. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 51, at 641 (“The most difficult task in obtaining
relief under appraisal statutes is establishing the fair value of the dissenting shares . . . .
Legislatures and the courts have not been able to establish any definite measure or
standard of value.”).
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conversion out of concern that it will abandon the local community,
than out of fear that her financial investment will deteriorate. A
remedy offering Sarah and other dissenters fair market value for their
shares, valued at the moment before the conversion’s announcement,
may just be inapposite to these concerns.
Finally, any realistic assessment of the FPC dissenters’ rights
provisions must take into account the serious costs and delays
associated with appraisal-type remedies. When these costs are
factored back into the equation, it is highly unlikely that dissenters’
rights will provide any shareholder with even purely financial
protection. Perhaps this remedy should instead be understood as a
means to review transactions without blocking them, possibly
discovering fiduciary wrongdoing along the way.55
Currently, FPC dissenters’ rights look frustratingly like empty
promises. A more aggressive appraisal-based remedy would set the
cash out price after the transaction’s announcement or completion,
either by default or at the option of the dissenting shareholder.
Alternatively, the statute could have provided novel, specialized
remedies for shareholders frustrated by the loss of a converting
FPC’s devotion to its special purpose. It might have locked all or
some portion of an FPC’s assets into pursuing its special purpose for
a period of time or indefinitely. The statute could have forced FPCs
to pay some penalty on exit from FPC status. The drafters declined
to take these steps or any other specialized remedial course, perhaps
because locking in social mission in this way would make FPCs look
and operate much more like nonprofits.
In realizing its goal of segregating FPCs from traditional corporate
forms, the FPC statute enlists both organizational leaders and
shareholders in key roles. Founders can select from a broad range of
charitable or other purposes. Yet, they must make their chosen
special purposes abundantly clear to the public, and especially to
shareholders. Founders or fiduciaries can propose the adoption or
renunciation of FPC form. Shareholders, however, will temper their
ability to act unilaterally through supermajority voting requirements
and express, though imperfect, dissenters’ rights.
B. Operating FPCs

This same pattern—discretion for fiduciaries with disclosure to
shareholders tasked with enforcement—reappears in the statute’s
55. See id. at 635–36; see also Kanda & Levmore, supra note 51, at 443–45. A
more detailed discussion of fiduciary challenges appears infra Part II.C.2.
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provisions regarding FPC operations. We can start with director
discretion. The statute provides that:
In discharging his or her duties, a director may consider those factors,
and give weight to those factors, as the director deems relevant,
including the short-term and long-term prospects of the flexible purpose
corporation, the best interests of the flexible purpose corporation and its
shareholders, and the purposes of the flexible purpose corporation as set
forth in its articles.56

This language was intended to make clear that FPC directors may
pursue purposes beyond, and even in conflict with, shareholder value
maximization.57 The FPC statute codifies protection from liability
when directors carry out their duties within the confines of this
additional discretion.58 In addition, individual FPCs may limit or
eliminate their directors’ exposure to monetary damages by adopting
exculpatory charter amendments.59 Finally, the statute expressly
disclaims any grant of standing to non-shareholder stakeholders to
challenge directorial action.60 FPC directors are permitted to
consider their articulated purposes, but shareholders alone may
challenge their operational decisions.61
Considering the FPC’s origins, it is not surprising that
constituency statutes share many of these attributes. Constituency
statutes also broaden directors’ permissible considerations beyond
the perceived strictures of the shareholder value maximization
norm.62 Constituency statutes, however, are also subject to a
powerful, unintended consequences critique.
By expanding
directorial discretion so widely, they may allow directors to mask
mismanagement and even malfeasance.63 If the sweep of a

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

CAL. CORP. CODE § 2700(c).
Britt, Johnson & MacCormac, supra note 35.
See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2700(d).
Id.
See id. § 2700(f).
Although the statute expressly renounces any negation of the Attorney
General’s power to police charitable trusts, it states “a flexible purpose corporation
shall not be deemed to hold any of its assets for the benefit of any party other than its
shareholders” and does not contemplate creating any new supervisory role for existing
regulators. See id. § 2700(e).
62. See supra notes 29 & 30 and accompanying text.
63. See Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr., Corporate Fiduciary Principles for the PostContractarian Era, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 561, 621–23 (1996) (making this criticism
and noting the wider debate); Brett H. McDonnell, Corporate Constituency Statutes
and Employee Governance, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1227, 1231–36 (2004)
(reviewing the literature on constituency statutes).
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constituency statute is so broad that a director can claim almost any
decision was made with the intent to better the lot of some nonshareholder stakeholder group, fiduciary obligations lose their teeth
of potential monetary liability, or even the reputational impact of a
serious public challenge.
Paradoxically, this critique argues,
constituency statutes leave directorial decisions essentially
unconstrained.
The terms of constituency statutes vary considerably across
jurisdictions, but in terms of this threat of unbridled discretion, the
FPC statute’s grant of discretion is narrow when compared with
many of them. Even without a constituency statute, directors of a
standard for-profit corporation would also have the discretion to
consider its short- and long-term prospects. They are certainly and
generally required to act “in the best interest of the corporation and
its shareholders.”64 The FPC statute’s grant of additional discretion
is thus only its permission to consider the special purpose or
purposes stated in an FPC’s articles of incorporation. An FPC’s
directors may not seek shelter in the statute’s grant of discretion by
claiming to have pursued any non-shareholder interest referenced in
the statute. Directors of an individual FPC receive only the
additional latitude to pursue the particular special purpose stated in
its charter.65 This mutes somewhat the reservation that FPC
directors’ discretion will be unbounded and impossible to police.
In this respect, the FPC statute’s grant of directorial discretion also
compares favorably with that provided to directors of benefit
corporations by many statutes enabling that form. For example,
directors of benefit corporations in New Jersey must consider:
[T]he employees and workforce of the benefit corporation and its
subsidiaries and suppliers, the interests of customers as beneficiaries of
the general or specific public benefit purposes of the benefit corporation;
community and societal considerations, including those of any

64. See, e.g., MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT. § 8.30(a) (2002) (requiring directors to “act:
(1) in good faith, and (2) in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best
interests of the corporation”). Numerous Delaware cases cite directors’ duty to pursue
the best interests of the corporation and its shareholders. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993) (“[T]he duty of loyalty mandates that
the best interest of the corporation and its shareholders takes precedence over any
interest possessed by a . . . controlling shareholder . . . .”); see also Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (“When a board addresses a pending
takeover bid it has an obligation to determine whether the offer is in the best interests
of the corporation and its shareholders. In that respect a board’s duty is no different
from any other responsibility it shoulders . . . .”).
65. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2700(c).
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community in which offices or facilities of the benefit corporation or its
subsidiaries or suppliers are located; the local and global environment;
and the short-term and long-term interests of the benefit corporation,
including benefits that may accrue to the benefit corporation from its
long-term plans and the possibility that these interests may be best
served by the continued independence of the benefit corporation.66

These benefit corporation directors may also consider “any other
pertinent factors or the interests of any other group that they deem
appropriate.”67 There are three important points of comparison here.
First, FPC directors are permitted to consider non-shareholder
interests, while benefit corporation directors are required to consider
them. Second, the non-shareholder interests FPC directors may
choose to consider are limited to those special purposes stated in the
FPC’s charter and thus on which their shareholders are particularly
on notice. In contrast, benefit corporation directors are required to
consider a range of non-shareholder interests as long as one’s
proverbial arm, and there is no particular requirement to apprise their
shareholders of which interests directors will prioritize. Third,
benefit corporation directors are further authorized to consider
anything else they deem relevant.
Commentators have noted the benefit corporation’s laundry list of
mandatory considerations offers little guidance to directors and will
hinder attempts to hold them accountable.68 The greater specificity
of purpose in an FPC softens, but does not entirely counteract, this
critique. FPCs will always be formed for at least two purposes, to
pursue a business and its special purpose. They may be formed for
multiple purposes, if more than one special purpose is selected and
disclosed. The statute does not require prioritization among any of
these purposes. Thus, when an FPC’s various purposes come into
conflict, it will be easy for its fiduciaries to defend their actions and
difficult for shareholders to challenge them.
C. Policing FPCs

Indeed, it is shareholders who will engage in any challenges to an
FPC’s operations. Their power to monitor and enforce is exclusive.
The statute enables this policing by imposing disclosure

66. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-6(a).
67. Id. § 14A:18-6(b).
68. See Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations, supra note 18, at 599–600;

Callison, Procrustean Bed, supra note 18, at 106–08; Murray, Choose Your Own
Master, supra note 18, at 27–34.
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requirements on FPCs and empowering their shareholders with
voting and litigation rights.
1. Disclosure

Under the statute, an FPC must engage in extensive reporting,
beyond what would be required for a generic California for-profit
corporation. Like in a standard for-profit, the FPC board must
provide an annual report to shareholders, containing a balance sheet,
income statement, and statement of cash flows.69 An FPC’s board
must also include in its annual report to shareholders, however, “a
management discussion and analysis (special purpose MD&A)
concerning the flexible purpose corporation’s stated purpose or
purposes as set forth in its articles.”70 The board must also make the
special purpose MD&A available on the FPC’s website.71
The statute goes into considerable detail regarding the required
contents of the special purpose MD&A. These reports will begin by
“[i]dentif[ying] and discuss[ing] . . . the short-term and long-term
objectives of the flexible purpose corporation relating to its special
purpose or purposes” as well as changes in them over the past year.72
FPCs might respond to this requirement by stating vague ideals and
platitudes, but the remaining items they must discuss demand greater
specification. An FPC annual report must identify its recent and
planned future “material actions” to pursue its special purpose
objectives, including the intended impact of these actions.73 For
material actions taken during the relevant fiscal year, the report must
also identify and discuss “the causal relationships between the
actions and the reported outcomes, and the extent to which those
actions achieved the special purpose objectives for the fiscal year.”74
Furthermore, the annual report must include substantial information

69. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 3500(a) (imposing these requirements on FPCs and
mandating that these documents be “accompanied by any report thereon of independent
accountants or, if there is no report, the certificate of an authorized officer of the
flexible purpose corporation that the statements were prepared without audit from the
books and records of the corporation”); id. § 1501(a)(1) (mandating similar reporting
by for-profits).
70. Id. § 3500(b).
71. Id. The statute allows a board to redact or otherwise manage the public posting
of its special purpose MD&A to avoid confidentiality breaches and leaves to each FPC
the decision of precisely which electronic means it will use to give the public access to
this document. See id.
72. Id. § 3500(b)(1).
73. See id. § 3500(b)(2)–(3).
74. Id. § 3500(b)(2).
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about the FPC’s recent and planned future expenditures.75 Finally,
the annual report must delve into “the process for selecting, and an
identification and description of, the financial, operating, and other
measures used by the flexible purpose corporation during the fiscal
year for evaluating its performance in achieving its special purpose
objectives.”76 It must explain why it chose the measures it did, and
give the reasons for any changes it has made to the measures it used
in the relevant period.77
In addition to these robust annual reports, an FPC must also make
a “special purpose current report” to shareholders and the public no
later than forty-five days after any of several key events.78 A current
report must address any expenditure that arises without inclusion in a
current annual report and that “has or is likely to have a material
adverse impact on the flexible purpose corporation’s results of
operations or financial condition for a quarterly or annual fiscal
period.”79 The board must also issue a current report if capital or
operating expenditures (other than officer or director compensation)
are made in a way not contemplated by its most recent annual
disclosure.80 Finally, the FPC must issue a current report if it deems
one of its stated special purposes to be satisfied or decides not to
pursue it any longer.81 These reports will keep diligent shareholders
and the public up to date on material changes in the FPC’s operations
and activities between annual reports.
FPC shareholders seeking to exercise their enforcement
prerogatives should find this rigorous level of disclosure helpful, but
it may prove daunting for social entrepreneurs considering the form.
The disclosure requirements not only outpace reporting required for
traditional for-profits but also reporting demanded from alternative
specialized forms. L3C statutes do not impose any specialized
reporting obligations on adopting entities. Benefit corporation
statutes vary somewhat in their reporting requirements, but even the
most onerous are not as thorough and frequent as the FPC’s.82

75. Id. § 3500(b)(5) (requiring identification of current “material operating and
capital expenditures . . . in furtherance of achieving the special purpose objectives” and
a “good faith estimate” of future ones).
76. Id. § 3500(b)(4).
77. See id.
78. See id. § 3501.
79. Id. § 3501(b).
80. See id. § 3501(c)(1).
81. Id. § 3501(c)(2).
82. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-11.
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The FPC statute, however, offers several components that may
assuage founders’ compliance concerns. First, the statute expressly
states that its reporting standards do not require disclosure of every
FPC purchase or plan.83 Second, the consequences of failures to
produce the required reports are limited. A fiduciary who causes
reports to include false or misleading statements may be held liable,84
but officers and directors are immunized against claims based on
forward-looking statements made in good faith.85 Even wholesale
failure to produce reports typically triggers only a mandate to
generate them, though if the failure to report is found “without
justification,” shareholders can recoup expenses incurred in
challenging the failure, including attorney’s fees.86 Third, the statute
establishes a presumption that all information required to be
presented in a special purpose MD&A or current report has been
provided if an FPC uses “best practices” to provide it.87 The statute
does not define these best practices, but instead leaves them to
“emerge” over time.88 Finally, any FPC with fewer than 100
shareholders can be relieved entirely of its obligation to produce
special purpose MD&A and current reports if it obtains waivers from
two-thirds of its outstanding shares.89 At least in small and closelyheld FPCs in which directors and shareholders overlap, one can
expect waivers to be granted as a matter of course. Whether waivers
will be easy to obtain in other types of FPCs will likely depend on
the relative appetite of shareholders for disclosure as compared with
their desire to limit compliance costs.
2. Enforcement Tools

Relying on information gleaned from the mandatory reports
detailed above, shareholders alone will police FPCs’ compliance
with their blended missions and that of their fiduciaries. In this
enforcement role, they have both legal and practical tools at their
disposal. As shareholders, they are entitled to vote for directors and
on certain major transactions and to bring derivative actions against
FPC fiduciaries. In addition, the market could play an important

83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.

See CAL. CORP. CODE § 3502(a).
See id. § 3503.
Id. § 3502(d).
See id. § 3502(b).
Id.
Id.
See id. § 3502(h). This section parallels waiver provisions for for-profit
corporations with fewer than 100 shareholders. See id. § 1501(a)(1).
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enforcement role, as investors will buy or sell their shares depending
on their confidence in the ability of an FPC investment to return both
economic and social value.
As shareholders in other corporate settings, FPC shareholders can
use their voting rights to enforce their preferences. Standard
California corporate law applies to authorize FPC shareholders to
elect and remove directors90 and approve bylaws by a majority vote.91
FPC shareholders, however, have special and uniquely strong voting
rights when an FPC wishes to remove its dedication to special
purposes. Whether this result will be achieved through article
amendment,92 merger,93 or other transaction,94 shareholders must
consent by a two-thirds majority. Standard California for-profit
corporations can often pursue these fundamental transactions with
lesser investor consensus.95 Thus, when it comes to protecting the
blended mission legacy of an FPC from the ultimate threat of its
abandonment, shareholders guard the gate. The information FPC
shareholders obtain from annual and current reports, as well as
transaction-specific disclosures, will help them to decide how to vote
in these end-game scenarios.
Information about FPC operations will also assist shareholders in
deciding whether to challenge the more everyday efforts and actions
of their fiduciaries. They may do so through voting rights in director
elections or through litigation. FPC shareholders may bring direct
suits alleging individual harms, such as the FPC’s failure to provide
required access to information or to hold mandated votes.96 In
addition, the statute authorizes shareholders—and only
shareholders97—to bring suit derivatively on behalf of the FPC.
These litigation rights are checked somewhat by the typical
procedural steps shareholders must complete before derivative suits
may be heard.98 Still, at least nominally, derivative suit rights afford
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See id. §§ 301(a), 303, 304.
See id. §§ 152, 211.
See id. § 3000(b).
See id. § 3201.
See id. §§ 3100, 3301(a)(2).
See id. §§ 1201, 181, 152 (requiring only the “affirmative vote of a majority of
the outstanding shares entitled to vote” for a reorganization outside the FPC context).
96. FPC shareholders’ rights here track those of ordinary shareholders. See COX &
HAZEN, supra note 51, at 443–49 (describing the distinction between direct and
derivative suits).
97. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2900(b) (“No action may be instituted or maintained in
right of any domestic or foreign flexible purpose corporation under this section by any
party other than a shareholder of the flexible purpose corporation.”).
98. See, e.g., id. § 2900(c)(2), (d) (requiring that the plaintiff first inform the board
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FPC shareholders authority to challenge directors’ and officers’
operations of their entities by challenging their fiduciary compliance.
Shareholders might claim fiduciary lapse when confronted with
reports detailing their FPC’s less than stellar achievements of special
purposes or its undesirable expenditures. But, let us unpack this
potential enforcement avenue a bit more carefully. Like in other
corporate forms,99 FPC shareholders will have little success in
achieving redress through litigation unless the disappointing results
or expenditures stem from a breach of loyalty. With loyalty
breaches, a fiduciary has placed her own interest ahead of her
corporation’s interest, engaging in some transaction or activity that
treats the corporation unfairly.100 If an FPC shareholder makes
allegations like these, she is likely to clear the procedural hurdles of
derivative litigation, and a court should make a searching review of
the activity or transaction to determine what the fiduciary gained and
what the FPC may have lost.
FPC shareholders may, however, be unhappy with the
management of a corporation even if no fiduciaries are being
enriched at its expense. They may believe directors are trading off
too much profit in order to pursue its special purposes, or that they
are sacrificing too little profit in their pursuit. They may believe
directors have made foolish, but not avaricious, business decisions.
These poor choices cost the FPC resources it could have used to
pursue either profit or social good. If generated and distributed to
shareholders and the public, the voluminous and detailed special
purpose MD&A and current reports might well reveal facts
supporting such beliefs. But, FPC shareholders will not likely have
financial incentives to bring legal claims for relief, as damage awards
are unlikely and would be paid to the corporation. Further, it is hard
to imagine the plaintiffs’ bar taking up such cases. Even putting
these practical impediments aside, shareholder derivative claims

of the impending lawsuit and furnish a bond, respectively).
99. See Geoffrey P. Miller, A Modest Proposal For Fixing Delaware’s Broken
Duty of Care, 2010 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 319, 322–25 (2010) (setting forth various
reasons why “the threat of money damages [for breach of a for-profit director’s duty of
care] has little or no force in Delaware”); Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity
Fiduciary Law, 57 MD. L. REV. 1400, 1440–42 (1998) (bemoaning the law’s propensity
to focus on breaches of care rather than of loyalty, as “courts seem more willing to
listen to duty-of-care complaints if the transaction is tainted by duty-of-loyalty
implications”).
100. See COX & HAZEN, supra note 51, at 220–23 (describing directors’ duties of
loyalty); Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms, supra note 15, at 15.
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alleging breaches of the duty of care based on these actions will
almost invariably fail.101
If FPC directors make decisions with reasonable inquiry and
information, without conflict of interest, and in good faith, courts
will review their substance in a quite cursory fashion. The FPC
statute imports language verbatim from California’s codified
business judgment rule, which protects directors from monetary
liability for simple negligence.102 As in a standard for-profit, an
individual FPC may adopt exculpatory charter amendments to further
limit or eliminate its directors’ exposure to monetary damages.103
Further, FPC directors may use the state’s common law business
judgment rule to further “insulate from court intervention
management decisions which are made by directors in good faith in
what the directors believe is the organization’s best interest” even in
suits seeking injunctive relief.104
Duty of care claims by FPC shareholders, however, face obstacles
beyond those experienced by ordinary for-profit shareholders. These
obstacles inhere in an FPC’s blended mission and are exacerbated by
the statute’s director protections. Again, an example is instructive.
Recall LocalCorp, our manufacturing concern founded as an FPC
with a special purpose of pursuing the long-term interests of its local
community along with profit for shareholders. Imagine its special
purpose MD&A reveals that it declined to renew its largest contract
with a local supplier in order to obtain an input more cheaply from
an out-of-state vendor. This type of action would not trigger any
voting rights for LocalCorp’s shareholders, but the FPC
appropriately disclosed the decision in a current report to
shareholders. A group of LocalCorp shareholders might read this
101. For a discussion of how courts might apply good faith analysis or a revived
fiduciary duty of obedience to consider such challenges across social enterprises, see
Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms, supra note 15, at 17–18. Such a reading of FPC
fiduciary duty would require interpretive enterprise by the courts, as suggestions of
either route are entirely absent from the statute. Thus, they are beyond the scope of the
current article.
102. Compare CAL. CORP. CODE § 309, with id. § 2700 (eliminating “liability based
upon any alleged failure to discharge the person’s obligations as a director” when a
director performs her duties “in good faith, in a manner the director believes to be in
the best interests of the [flexible purpose] corporation and its shareholders, and with
that care, including reasonable inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent person in a like
position would use under similar circumstances”) (bracketed language in FPC statute
only). A recent federal case held that this California provision affords business
judgment protection only to directors, and not to officers. See FDIC v. Perry, No. CV
11-5561, ODW (MRWx) 2012 WL 589569, at *1, *4 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 21, 2012).
103. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2700(d).
104. See Berg & Berg Enters., LLC v. Boyle, 100 Cal. Rptr. 3d 875, 897 (Ct. App.
2009).
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report, disapprove of the action, and bring a fiduciary duty challenge.
Assuming the decision posed no conflicts of interest for fiduciaries,
this claim seems most easily styled as a breach of the duty of care.105
Perhaps shareholders would seek only injunctive relief, and we can
assume arguendo that their claim would not be blocked by the
demand requirement or stymied by the business judgment rule. Still,
challenged directors could simply defend on grounds that in this
decision they decided to pursue greater profit and would continue to
pursue the FPC’s special purposes in other ways. Essentially, the
same scenario would play out if the decision ran in precisely the
opposite direction, with the FPC throwing over a dependable out-ofstate vendor for an upstart local one.
FPC directors’ discretion to consider multiple non-prioritized
purposes will frustrate shareholders’ efforts to hold them accountable
under the duty of care. Of course, this may be sensible, as courts’
lack of expertise in business matters and the need to encourage
responsible risk-taking by fiduciaries may justify deference to nonconflicted FPC decisions just as to those of for-profit directors.
Moreover, there may be little impact from weaker review of FPC
directorial decisions because standard corporate law limits this
review so markedly already. But, at least wholly irrational decisions
are theoretically the basis for potential scrutiny and liability in an
ordinary for-profit. This “two masters” problem106 makes even this
minimal level of review more challenging for an FPC, though
admittedly not as challenging as the virtually unlimited “masters” in
a benefit corporation.107
A shareholder, of course, may pursue one other option if she feels
her FPC is not pursuing profit and social good in accordance with her
preferences—exit. Rather than vote out the board or bring derivative
litigation, our disgruntled LocalCorp shareholder may well prefer to

105. See Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms, supra note 15, at 15–17.
106. This shorthand has been used by virtually every author writing on specialized

entities for social enterprise, including myself. See Carter G. Bishop, The Low-Profit
LLC (L3C): Program Related Investment By Proxy Or Perversion?, 63 ARK. L. REV.
243, 243 (2010); Alicia E. Plerhoples, Can an Old Dog Learn New Tricks—Applying
Traditional Corporate Law Principles to New Social Enterprise Legislation, 13 TENN.
J. BUS. L. 221, 223 (2012); Callison & Vestal, supra note 15, at 288; Murray &
Hwang, supra note 15, at 39–40; Brakman Reiser, Blended Enterprise, supra note 15,
at 105; Linda O. Smiddy, Corporate Creativity: The Vermont L3C & Other
Developments in Social Entrepreneurship, 35 VT. L. REV. 3, 7 (2010); Tyler, supra
note 15 passim.
107. See Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations, supra note 18, at 599–600;
Callison, Procrustean Bed, supra note 18, at 106–08; Murray, Choose Your Own
Master, supra note 18, at 27–34.
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sell her shares, end her involvement with LocalCorp, and seek out
substitutes. Further, the fear of shareholders’ divestiture may
motivate fiduciaries to follow shareholder preferences. Yet, exit is
effective to protect shareholders’ interests and incentivize fiduciaries
to align their actions with those interests only in the shadow of a
market for FPC shares. Importantly, the reverse is also true. If no
realistic market exists for FPC shares, directors will be less
motivated to align their actions with shareholders’ desires, and
shareholders will have only the limited tools of voting or litigation to
express their critiques of FPC management.108 As a vibrant market
for FPC shares is unlikely, at least for some time, the value of exit in
enforcement is limited.
The exit rights of FPC shareholders bring to light one final
important limitation on the statute’s framework for monitoring these
new entities. As noted earlier, when it comes to monitoring and
enforcing the obligations of FPCs and their fiduciaries, shareholders
stand alone.109 Although the public may view posted annual reports
and special purpose MD&As, the statute does not provide anyone but
shareholders with legal tools for enforcement. Even members of
classes particularly singled out for consideration in an FPC’s articles
of incorporation lack voting authority or standing to challenge the
actions of its leaders.110
There can be good reasons to avoid general rights of participation
or grants of standing to the public or even beneficiary classes in
organizations formed to promote social good. In the somewhat
analogous case of charities, public standing is rejected because
litigious individuals opposed to the charitable mission of a particular
entity might otherwise be motivated to bring damaging nuisance
suits against it.111 Such suits would drain charitable resources.112

108. See Plerhoples, supra note 106, at 257–58 (describing the potential
accountability gap for directors in FPC control transactions).
109. See supra Part II.C.2.
110. Alicia Plerhoples describes this aspect of the FPC statute as embracing
“shareholder primacy,” but a shareholder primacy norm uniquely sensitive to the
combined profit and social good preferences FPC shareholders are assumed to hold.
See Plerhoples, supra note 106, at 256 (“To the extent that investors in the flexible
purpose corporation have non-economic interests, then those interests must be
advanced along with the shareholders’ financial interests in order to uphold shareholder
primacy.”).
111. See MARION FREMONT-SMITH, GOVERNING NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 333
(2004) (explaining that limits on standing are needed to “permit fiduciaries to function
without unwarranted abuse and harassment”).
112. See Mary Grace Blasko et al., Standing to Sue in the Charitable Sector, 28
U.S.F. L. REV. 37, 42 (1993).
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Moreover, the possibility of such litigation could exacerbate the
difficulty charities already experience in attracting and retaining
qualified directors and officers.113 These concerns have some
resonance for social enterprises, and FPCs have the ready solution of
shareholder standing to appear to solve the enforcement problem.
Whether exclusive shareholder enforcement is a satisfactory
solution depends upon one’s view of the interests an FPC should
serve. At least at the outset, FPC shareholders should have
preferences regarding its special purpose aligned with those
expressed by the entity’s founders and stated in its articles.114 Over
time, however, shareholders’ views on the desirability of the entity’s
special purpose, including their preference for its pursuit over profit,
may change. If an FPC should be operated for the benefit of its
shareholders, as their preferences change, the entity’s course should
change as well. On this view, exclusive shareholder monitoring is
effective. In contrast, if one views a social enterprise as one imbued
with an obligation to interests beyond its shareholders, exclusive
monitoring by shareholders will not necessarily be effective to
address special purpose failures.
Consider once again Edify FPC, formed to pursue profits and
provide low-cost educational services to children of the working
poor, the directors of which propose amending its articles to
transform the entity’s purposes to pursue profits and the long-term
positive effects of its activities on its employees. The directors
disclose to shareholders that this change of purpose will result in
offering its educational services at higher prices to offset investments
in professional development and higher wages for its employees.
Shareholders, by more than a two-thirds majority, approve the
change. Representatives of the children Edify FPC serves, the local
educational community, or the public at large will have no role to
play in this decision. If an FPC should be operated solely in the
interest of its shareholders and their preferences regarding pursuit of
its special purposes, this is proper. If creating an FPC, however,
should create some ongoing obligation to consider the interests
identified in its special purposes, as those interests or related
stakeholders would view them, exclusive shareholder enforcement is
insufficient.

113. See FREMONT-SMITH, supra note 111, at 325 (“[I]t would be impossible to
manage charitable funds, or even to find individuals to take on the task, if the
fiduciaries were to be constantly subject to harassing litigation.”) (emphasis added).
114. See Plerhoples, supra note 106, at 252–54.
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Shareholders have an important legal role to play in enforcement
of FPC obligations, especially in an end-game situation where
change of status is contemplated. Unless strong consensus among
shareholders approves a change, the FPC must retain its special
purpose character. As far as enforcing the blended mission mandate
against more ordinary hazards, though, shareholders remain the only
enforcer and their legal tools are weak. Shareholders may contest an
FPC’s compliance with its special purpose obligations, and that of its
directors, but will face many obstacles in securing monetary liability
or even injunctive relief. Further, depending on one’s view of the
ultimate purpose of FPCs, policing by shareholders alone may be
insufficiently protective of special purposes.
3. Summary

The FPC statute follows a market-driven approach to monitoring
and enforcement. It demands that FPC founders state their mission
clearly and disclose their actions comprehensively. Then, it
authorizes shareholders alone to enforce, with relatively strong legal
tools in end-game scenarios and relatively limp ones in ordinary
situations. It remains uncertain whether incentives will be sufficient
for FPC shareholders to digest and utilize the information they
receive, and how effectively they will employ the legal and practical
tools at their disposal to police FPCs’ blended missions.
III. EVALUATING FPCS

The FPC provides an organizational form enabling founders to
clearly articulate both profit and social goals. Its structures for
segregating, operating, and policing FPCs, however, differ
importantly from the prior L3C and benefit corporation forms. In all
of these respects, the FPC statute relies on directors to act within
broad discretion and shareholders to enforce based on extensive
disclosures.
In segregating FPCs from other corporate forms, the FPC statute
relies on founders’ own specification of a special purpose or
purposes in organizational documents, without recourse to or use of
any third-party standard. The FPC’s special purposes may be drawn
from a broad range of potential interests and stakeholder groups, but
they must be clearly identified and disclosed to shareholders and the
public. Viewers of these disclosures can then make their own
decisions about whether to involve themselves with a given FPC,
through consumption of its products or services, employment or
business dealings, or—most importantly—investment. Once created,
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supermajority voting provisions create greater lock-in for an FPC’s
special purpose than would be found in an L3C form, through
provisions similar to those imposed by benefit corporation statutes.
FPC shareholders also possess dissenters’ rights, a concept rarely
found in other specialized forms,115 though one of potentially less
value than may initially appear.
The FPC statute provides a substantial architecture for operating
FPCs, which relies on an express grant of discretion to directors.
These clear instructions on structure and decision-making contrast
sharply with the L3C form. L3C adopters must design their
governance arrangements individually by contract and will find no
guidance in the statute on managing fiduciary obligations in a dual or
multiple mission entity. The benefit corporation, as an incorporated
form, provides an “off-the-rack” set of operating structures quite
similar to the FPC. Its grant of discretion to directors is, however,
importantly distinct. FPC directors may choose to consider the
special purposes articulated in its articles, along with the interests of
shareholders, in making decisions. Benefit corporation directors are
required to consider a laundry list of divergent interests in making
their decisions and are thereby given virtually absolute discretion.
To police FPCs, the statute relies exclusively on shareholders. To
boost their effectiveness, shareholders are afforded uniquely
comprehensive disclosures. Although the FPC statute takes several
steps to reduce the burden of its disclosure requirements, they remain
considerably more extensive than those demanded of benefit
corporations and, again, involve no third-party standards. Few L3C
statutes impose any disclosure requirements at all.
Armed with detailed information about FPC operations and
achievements, shareholders are empowered to enforce the obligations
of FPCs and their fiduciaries through voting and litigation rights.
These enforcement tools far surpass those of L3C investors. They
are similar to the enforcement rights of benefit corporation
shareholders, though not identical. Both forms require supermajority
shareholder approval for change of status, but their litigation
mechanisms can differ. FPC shareholders may pursue fiduciary
115. The California and South Carolina benefit corporation statutes do provide
dissenters’ rights. Those under the California statute are identical to the dissenters’
rights under the FPC statute. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 14604. The South Carolina
statute provides its appraisal-type remedy only for shareholders of for-profits who
dissent from a conversion to a benefit corporation. See A277, 119th Gen. Assemb.,
Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2012) (to be codified at S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-38-230). The
Washington Social Purpose Corporation statute also contains an appraisal provision.
See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 23B.25.120 (2012).

2012

THE NEXT BIG THING: FLEXIBLE PURPOSE CORPORATIONS

83

claims through typical derivative actions but are not granted access
to a special enforcement process like the benefit enforcement
proceeding.
CONCLUSION

We do not yet know if the FPC, or any other specialized form for
social enterprise, will break out of the pack and become “the next big
thing.” All of these forms are novel, and it will be some time before
many of their provisions are interpreted and their usefulness is
determined. Despite the early stage of their development and the
variation in the details of their structures, they all face a common
struggle. They all allow social entrepreneurs to articulate a blended
mission to pursue profit and social good, but none offers a clear path
to enforcement.116 To become a brand that attracts the capital social
entrepreneurs desire, a specialized form will need to meet this
serious enforcement challenge.117 For the FPC, experience will need
to prove that exclusive policing by shareholders will—or even can—
be effective in enforcing blended mission.

116. In the L3C, enforcement concerns arise because fiduciary duty is unclear and
the entity can be effortlessly transformed into a standard LLC. See Brakman Reiser,
Blended Enterprise, supra note 15, at 108–11; Brakman Reiser, Governing and
Financing, supra note 11, at 650; Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms, supra note 15, at
18–19; Callison & Vestal, supra note 15, at 286–88. But see Murray & Hwang, supra
note 15, at 39–40; Tyler, supra note 15, at 141 (viewing the L3C’s enforcement
prospects more favorably). The benefit corporation grants virtually unbridled
discretion to directors, shares the FPC’s problematic dependence on shareholder
enforcement, and its reliance on third-party standards may set the stage for
greenwashing. See Brakman Reiser, Benefit Corporations, supra note 18, at 611–17;
Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms, supra note 15, at 20–28, 38–39; Callison,
Procrustean Bed, supra note 18, at 94–97, 106–11; Murray, Choose Your Own Master,
supra note 18, at 27–36.
117. See Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms, supra note 15, at 40.

